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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  elaborates  a fixed-coefficient,  capital,  labor, 
non-raw  material  intermediates,  raw materials  production  model; 
estimates  the  wage  share-profit  rate  frontier  associated  with  it 
for U.S.  manufacturing  from  1949 to  1986;  and  suggests  the 
following  explanation  of declining  profitability.  From  1949 to 
1970,  a rising  wage  share  drove  the manufacturing  industries  up 
along  the  wage-profit  frontier.  Declines  in relative  raw 
material  prices  shifted  the  frontier  out  in this  period.  From 
1970  to  1986,  raw material  prices  shocks  shifted  the  frontier  in, 
but  as raw material  prices  declined  in the  198Os,  the  failure  of 
either  the  wage  share  or the  rate  of profit  to  recover  to their 
previous  levels  suggests  that  a secular  decline  in the  output- 
capital  ratio  has  rotated  the  frontier  inwards.  This  finding  has 
significance  for the  tneory  of technical  change. 
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.(315)-824-1000 I. Introduction 
According  to estimates  developed  for this  paper,  the before- 
tax  rate  of return  on  fixed  capital  and  inventories  in U.S. 
manufacturing  industries  declined  by  over  50 percent  from  1949 
to  1986.  The paper  elaborates  a fixed-coefficient  capital, 
labor,  intermediates  production  model,  estimates  the  wage  share- 
profit  rate  frontier  (hereafter  the wage-profit  frontier) 
corresponding  to  it, and  suggests  the  following  explanation. 
From  1949 to  1970, profits  were  squeezed  by  a rise  in the 
wage  share,  accounting  for most  of the  roughly  40 percent  decline 
in profitability.  Declines  in the  output-capital  ratio  and 
relative  raw material  prices  offset  one  another  over  this 
interval.  From  1970 to  1986,  the wage  share  declined,  yet the 
rate  of profit  declined  another  15 percent.  Since  raw material 
prices  fell  in the  1980s  to  1960s  levels,  a reduced 
output-capital  ratio  emerges  the  likely  source  of reduced 
profitability.  Indeed,  the persistent  decline  in the 
output-capital  ratio  suggests  that  technical  change  has  a 
capital-using  bias. 
The  explanation  compares  with  that  of Bruno  and  Sachs 
(1985), who  assume  a putty-putty  production  function  with  Harrod 
neutral  technical  change.  In this  model,  the  profit  squeeze 
that  occured  in the  1960s  caused  capital  deepening  as an effect 
of rising  product  wages  measured  in efficiency  units  of labor. 
By extension,  a period  of  falling  product  wages 
capital  shallowing.  The  final  sections  develop 
should  initiate 
the  comparison. 
1 II.  The Wage-Profit  Frontier 
It will  be useful  to describe  the model  and the  data 
simultaneously.  The model  metaphorically  assumes  that 
manufacturing  produces  one homogenous  good  (corn oii)  by means  of 
capital,  labor,  raw materials  (corn) imported  from  a primary 
sector,  and non-raw  material  intermediates  (corn oil  lubricates 
the  presses).  At  a point  in time,  production  coefficients  are 
fixed.  One may  justify  the  capital  coefficient  by  assuming 
putty-clay  technology,  and noting  that  most  of the  capital  stock 
is committed  to old vintages.  The growth  rate  of the  gross 
capital  stock  (about 3.4 percent  per  year)  roughly  measures  the 
proportion  of putty  in a given  year.  Over  time,  new vintages 
cumulatively  affect  the technological  structure,  much  technical 
change  is of the  disembodied  variety  (learning  by doing,  e.g.), 
and the  coefficients  evolve  as a net  effect  in ways  that  can be 
captured  by trends. 
Fixed  capital  destroys  the  simplicity  of the  corn  oil 
metaphor.  For  a large  variety  of indexes,  the  relative  price  of 
the  capital  stock  of manufacturing  rises  over  the  interval;  see 
column  7 of table  1 for an example.  Given  that  much  manufacturing 
capital  stock  was  yesterday'8  own-product,  one  infers  that 
technical  progress  has bestowed  its blessings  less  generously 
upon  the.capital  goods  department  than  upon  the  consumption  and 
intermediate  goods  departments.1  As this  represents  a 
technological  effect  internal  to manufacturing,  I gainsay  the 
relevance  of distinguishing  a real  from  a nominal  output-capital 
2 ratio  (note both  have  the  dimension  l/time)  within  the  confines 
of the  model. 
Both  the  total  output  and GDP to gross  capital  ratios 
decline  over  the  sample;  see columns  8 and  9 of table  1.  A 
simple  trend  on the  capital-output  ratio  is assumed  in estimating 
the  wage-profit  frontier.  For  additional  discussion,  see the 
penultimate  section. 
Non-raw  material  intermediates  behave  similarly  to 
manufacturing  output  in general;  about  60 percent  are  own-inputs. 
Their  relative  price,  measured  by the Producer  Price  Index  for 
Materials  and Components  for Manufacturing  and  a price  index  for 
total  manufacturing  output,  diverges  little  from unity;  see 
column  5 of table  1. 
The  first  three  columns  of table  1 use  BEA  Input-Output  data 
to  show  cost  shares  of intermediates.  Raw materials  from 
agriculture  and mining  account  for most  of the variation  in total 
intermediate  cost  shares.  Their  relative  price,  using  the 
Producer  Price  Index  for Crude  Materials  for Further  Processing, 
declines  from  1949 to the  early  197Os,  exhibits  two  familiar 
spikes  in the  197Os,  and then  drifts  down  to  levels  of the  late 
1960s;  see  column  6-of table  1.  Input-output  coefficients  for 
the  two  categories  of  intermediate  goods  are  assumed  constant  in 
estimating  the  wage-profit  frontier. 
2 
The  internal  rate  of return  of the  capital  stocks  is usually 
approximated  by  a net  accounting  rate  of return,  but  as this 
measure  can be  obtained  only with  difficulty  owing  to the  non- 
3 existence  of capital  consumption  adjustments  I use  a gross 
accounting  rate,  gross  operating  surplus  divided  by  gross  capital 
stocks.  Hill  (1979, Ch.  3) describes  the  conditions  under  which 
the  gross  accounting  rate measures  the  internal  rate  at least  as 
precisely  as does  the  net  accounting  rate.  For  a comparison  of 
the  net  and  gross  rates  in the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector, 
consult  Feldstein  and  Summers  (1977). 
The  gross  rate  of return  is adjusted  for capacity 
utilization  by  dividing  it by  the  capacity  utilization  index,  as 
are  the  output-capital  ratios  in table  1.  More  complex 
techniques  were  not  obviously  superior  at  filling  the  valleys  of 
the  time  series.  The  capacity  utilization  index  cumulates  the 
net  additions  to capacity  reported  by the  McGraw-  Hill  capacity 
survey  and  divides  into  the FRB  Industrial  Production  Index. 
This  index  seems  to  capture  both  cyclical  and  secular  changes  in 
utilization  and  aligns  closely  for years  of overlap  with  that 
constructed  by Christensen  and  Jorgenson  (1969)  from horsepower 
ratings  of the  electric  motors  in manufacturing.  Where 
appropriate,  sensitivity  of results  to  an alternative  capacity 
adjustment  using  the  FRB  Capacity  Utilization  Index  is indicated. 
The  declines  in output-capital  ratios  in table  1 do not  depend  on 
index  choice. 
The wage-profit  frontier  for the KLNM  (capital,  labor,  non- 
raw material  intermediates,  raw materials)  model  derives  from the 
following  price  equation,  which  applies  to a state  of  full 
utilization 
4 (1)  p  =  [a(t)PKl 
P  -  Price 
a(t)  -  Gross 
K  - Gross 
Rg  +  w  l(t) 
of output,x 
capital-output 
capital  stocks 
fixed  stocks  plus 
+  n Pn  +  m Pm 
coefficient,  K/X,  at time  t 
equal  end-of-year  gross 
end-of-year  inventories, 
constant  1982 dollars 
pK  - Price  deflator  for gross  capital  stocks,  K 
Rg  - Gross  accounting  rate  of return,  adjusted  for 
utilization 
W  - Nominal  wage 
l(t)  - Labor  hours-output  coefficient,  L/X,  at time  t 
Pn  - Price  of non-raw  material  intermediates,  N 
n  - Non-raw  material  intermediate-output 
coefficient,  N/X 
pm  - Price  of raw materials,  M 
m  - Raw material-output  coefficient,  M/X 
The wage-profit  frontier  is 
(2)  w=l  -  [a(t)pKl  Rg  -  nPn  - mPm 
w  -  Wage  share  in total  output,  WL/PX 
Pi  -  Relative  price  of i, Pi/P 
One  advantage  of this  framework  is that  it does  not  require  us to 
specify  the  time-dependent  movement  of  labor  productivity. 
The wage  share  in total  output  uses  the  BEA  estimate  of 
total  compensation  in manufacturing  divided  by the  total  output 
estimate  from the  BLS  Time  Series  Data  for  Input-Output 
Industries.  The price  deflator  for total  output  comes  from the 
same  BLS  source.  The BLS  data  begin  in 1958,  and have  been 
extrapolated  backwards  with  shipments  (for total  output)  and the 
Producer  Price  Index  for Finished  Goods  (for price  deflator). 
To aid  interpretation  of the  results,  and the  narrative 
drawn  from them,  consider  the  slope  and  intercepts  of  (2).  The 
Rg  intercept  is  (1 - mpm  - npn)/a(t)pK  or the  ratio  of GDP  to 
capital  stock.  It declines  if the  total  output-capital  ratio 
5 falls,  or  if either  intermediate  price  rises.  The  raw material 
price  changes  described  above  account  for much  interesting 
variation  in this  intercept,  but  the  decline  in the  total 
output-capital  ratio  reduces  it secularly.  The w-intercept  is 
(1 - mpm  - npn)  or the  ratio  of GDP to total  output.  Raw 
material  price  increases  thus  shift  the  frontier  toward  the 
origin,  while  declines  in the  total  output-capital  ratio  rotate 
the  frontier  about  its w-intercept,  ceteris  paribus. 
III.  Estimates  of  the  Wage-Profit  Frontier 
Because  OLS versions  of equation  (2) generate  Durbin-Watson 
statistics  well  below  the  lower  limit  for positive  first-order 
correlation,  all  estimates  appearing  in table  2 use  a Cochrane- 
Orcutt  transformation.  One explanation  for the  serial 
correlation  may  simply  be that  the  capacity  adjustment  (or lack 
of  it for some  variables)  inevitably  leaves  a residue  of cyclical 
error  in the  data. 
The  second  and  third  estimates  in table  2 suggest  that  the 
model  is robust  with  respect  to capacity  utilization  adjustments 
(estimate  2 uses  the  FRB  index)  and  sample  size  (estimate  3 
eliminates  the poorer-quality  pre-1958  data). 
Coefficient  estimates  in table  2 are plausible  but  some  are 
not  very  precise.  The  actual  capital-output  ratio,  adjusted  for 
utilization,  was  about  0.426  in 1949;  estimate  1 of table  2 
implies  a ratio  of  0.278.  One may  rationalize  this  discrepancy 
by  noting  that  the wage-profit  frontier  for a multi-industry 
model  with  Leontief  technology  is probably  convex  to the  origin, 
6 owing  to  "price  Wicksell  effects."  A  linear  approximation  such 
as equation  (2) could  be  expected  to misstate  the  Rg  intercept. 
Evidently  this  is an  inefficient  technique  for measuring  the 
capital-output  ratio. 
The  average  annual  increase  in the  actual  adjusted  capital- 
output  ratio  was  0.0119;  all the  estimates  in table  2 come  close 
to this  benchmark. 
The  implied  share  of non-raw  material  intermediate  costs  in 
estimate  1 appears  too  large,  and that  of raw materials  too 
small.  The  coefficients  represent  implied  shares  measured  at the 
base  year,  1982.  Estimate  4 includes  a one-period  lagged  value 
of pm  on the  grounds  that  the production  lag generates  a lag 
between  raw material  price  changes  and their  effects  on booked 
profits.  Another  rationale  is that  Pn,  an index  which  includes 
intermediates  at various  stages  of production  from  gasoline  to 
auto  parts,  suffers  from multiple  counting.  Including  the  lagged 
raw material  price  improves  the  distribution  of price  effects 
over  non-raw  material  intermediates  and  raw materials.  The 
implied  raw material  share  in 1982 becomes  12.9 percent  and the 
implied  non-raw  material  intermediate  share  54.1  percent. 3 
For  a broad  view  of developments,  all  of the  estimates  in 
table  2 agree,  but  as the narrative  that  follows  does  require 
some precision  about  the  intermediate  shares  for the  198Os, 
figure  1 plots  the  average  predictions  of estimate  4 for selected 
intervals.  To avoid  compressing  the  actual  data  into  a replica 
of the Pleiades,  the  origin  of figure  1 is  (23.5,8);  the  reader 
7 should  ignore  apparent  vertical  axis  intercepts,  as these  can 
mislead. 
The  connected  raw data  for Rg  (adjusted)  and w  in figure  1 
begin  in the  southeast  corner  at 1949, wind  their  way  up to  1970 
in a suggestive  profile,  and then  are driven  to the  southwest  by 
repeated  raw material  price  shocks.4  In 1986, when  the  raw 
material  price  index  falls  to roughly  its  1968  level,  the  datum 
remains  in the  southwest  region,  prima  facie  evidence  of the 
decline  in capital  productivity  modeled  by the  trend  terms  in 
table  2. 
The  raw material  price  declines  from the  1950s  to the  1960s 
push  the  frontier  out,  so that  most  of the profit  squeeze  occurs 
under  conditions  of an improvement  in the wage-profit  tradeoff. 
Note  that  the  secular  rise  in the  capital-output  ratio  steepens 
the  frontier  over  this  interval.  The  raw material  price  shocks 
of the  early  1970s  shift  the  frontier  inward  quite  sharply,  as do 
those  (not shown)  in the  late  1970s. 
The  decline  in raw material  prices  by  1986  seems  not  to have 
raised  the w-intercept  to  its  1968  level  because  the  relative 
price  of non-raw  material  intermediates  remains  quite  high.  Both 
the predictions  of estimate  4 and the  actual  data5  reported  in 
column  4 of table  1 suggest  that  the total  intermediate  share  in 
1986  is about  the  same  or slightly  larger  than  it was  in the 
early  197Os,  and that  it is larger  than  it was  in the  1960s. 
Thus,  since  they  share  an intercept,  comparison  of the  1986  and 
1970s  frontiers  in figure  1 dramatizes  the  importance  of 
8 declining  capital  productivity,  which  has  rotated  the  frontier 
inward  over  this  interval.  The  remaining  two  sections  address 
alternative  interpretations  of a simultaneously  falling  wage 
share,6  output-capital  ratio,  and rate  of profit. 
IV.  A Neoclassical  Interpretation? 
Since  many  readers  will  suspect  that  the  decline  in the 
output-capital  ratio  reflects  traditional  capital  deepening, 
which  has been  assumed  away by the  KLNM  model,  I present  some 
weak  evidence  to the  contrary.  Bruno  and  Sachs's  (1985) 
estimates  of the wage  rate-profit  rate  frontier  for U.S. 
manufacturing  invite  comparison.  They  assume  a capital,  labor, 
materials  production  function  weakly  separable  in materials. 
Capital  and  labor  produce  value  added  in a Cobb-Douglas  function; 
value  added  and materials  produce  output  in a CES  function;  there 
are  constant  returns  to  scale.  Technical  change  is assumed  to be 
Harrod  neutral,  and to be uniform  through  time.  The model  is 
estimated  by7 
(3)  log(R)  = bg  + bl Time  + b2  log(W/PPI)  + b3  log(Pm/PPI) 
+ b4  log(FRB  Capacity  Utilization) 
Table  4 reports  results  of  fitting  this  model  to more  recent 
issues  of the  same  data  used  by  its authors.  In particular,  note 
that  data  for the  net  accounting  rate  of return  (R) from Holland 
and Myers  (1984) are now  available  for a larger  sample. 
With  the  new  data,  estimate  1 replicates  but  does  not 
duplicate  Bruno  and  Sachs's  original  result  for  1955-1978.  This 
estimate  is a plausible  fit  for a KLM-type  model,  with  materials 
9 defined  somewhat  more  broadly  than  raw materials  above.  The 
implied  rate  of technical  progress  is 1.4 percent.  The  implied 
material  share  at a base  point  is around  40 percent.  Based  on 
this  estimate,  the  decline  in capital  productivity  through  the 
1960s  is a straightforward  example  of capital  deepening  propelled 
by  the  rise  in product  wage  per  efficiency  unit  of labor.  Bruno 
and  Sachs  show  (1985, Fig.  2a.3)  that  this  product  wage  rises 
throughout  the  1960s  and  falls  during  the  1970s.8  Does  capital 
productivity  continue  to decline? 
The  remaining  estimates  suggest  that  (3) is misspecified. 
Enlarging  the  sample  backwards,  coefficients  remain  plausible 
(technical  progress  runs  at  1.6 percent  per  year,  the material 
share  is about  28 percent).  The Durbin-Watson,  however,  drops  to 
just below  its  lower  limit.  Further,  both  estimate  1 and  2 
generate  out-of-sample  forecasts  for 1979-81  that  overshoot  by 
around  3 to  4 percentage  points.  Adding  these  three  years  to the 
sample,  in estimate  3, pushes  the Durbin  statistic  well  below  its 
lower  limit.  More  disturbing,  the  coefficients  no  longer  have 
plausible  values;  note,  in particular  the  negative  sign  on the 
trend.  One  suspects  that  these  are  symptoms  of a fairly  major 
specification  problem. 
All  this  is no reason  to  reject  a capital  deepening 
explanation.  Applied  models  of this  type  are  chosen  for their 
utility  and  this  one gave  its authors  great  insight  into the 
issue  they  addressed  (specifically,  the  impact  of raw material 
price  shocks  on the wage  rate-profit  rate  frontier).  More 
10 importantly,  the  above  overstates  the  case.  Capital  productivity 
does  increase  from  1972 to  1977  (see column  8 of table  1) 
although  this  is sensitive  to the  choice  of utilization  index. 
The  remaining  section  elaborates  the  alternative  account  of 
technical  change  that  led me to adopt  the  approach  of the present 
paper,  rather  than,  for example,  to  search  for a putty-putty 
translog  version  of the  KLNM  model.9 
V.  An  Alternative  Interpretation 
To those  well-versed  in such matters,  the  rising  capital- 
output  ratio  might  seem  to be  a confirmation  of Marx's  rising 
organic  composition  of capital,  with  its attendant  Gesetz  des 
tendenziellen  Falls  der  Profitrate.  Yet  few Marxian  economists 
subscribe  to this  putative  law, primarily  because  of the 
influence  of a theorem  due  to Okishio  (1961) and  resurrected  by 
Roemer  (1977). 
The  issue  is whether  a technical  change  which  is viable,  in 
the  sense  that  it raises  the  firm's  transitional  rate  of profit 
or equivalently  lowers  its unit  costs,  can  cause  a general 
decline  in profitability  when  it diffuses  throughout  the  industry 
and  a new  equilibrium  price  vector  forms.  Firms  calculate  the 
transitional  rate  at original  wages  and prices,  using  the 
original  profit  rate  for discounting  purposes.  The Okishio 
Theorem  states  that  in a circulating  capital,  Leontief 
technology  world,  no viable  technique  will  lower  the  system-wide 
rate  of profit  if product  wages  remain  constant.  Roemer  (1979) 
generalizes  the  result  to von Neumann  technology,  which  includes 
11 fixed  capital  as a special  case.  If product  wages  are  constant, 
there  will  be  a rising  tendency  to the  rate  of profit,  even  if 
the  output-capital  ratio  falls. 
Roemer  (1978) presents  the polar  opposite  case  in a model  in 
which  product  wages  rise  in response  to technical  change  such 
that  the  wage  share  remains  constant  in each  of two  sectors, 
capital  and  consumption  goods,  that  have  Leontief  technology  and 
use  circulating  capital.  A viable,  capital-using,  labor-saving 
technical  change,  (strictly  increasing  in unit  capital 
requirements,  strictly  decreasing  in unit  labor  requirements) 
will  always  depress  the  rate  of profit  if it is introduced  in the 
capital  goods  sector.lO  It will  not  affect  the profit  rate  if it 
is only  introduced  in the  consumption  goods  sector. 
Modeling  a rising  capital-output  ratio  with  trends  follows 
naturally  from the  causal  ordering  of Roemer's  (1978) model,  at 
least  as a first  approximation.  Wage  increases  are  an effect, 
not  a cause,  of viable  technical  changes.  The  rising 
capital-output  ratio  is thus  one test  for the  existence  of the 
type  of technical  change  which  this  theory  hypothesizes.  The 
theory  neither  denies  nor  requires  traditional  capital  deepening; 
a putty-clay  model  would  seem  to  fit well  with  it,  for example. 
In the  terms  of the  one manufactured  commodity  model  of the 
present  paper,  if we  assume  constant  intermediate  coefficients 
and prices,  we might  have  a one-sector,  fixed  capital  version  of 
Roemer's  model.  It is intuitive  that  a viable,  capital-using, 
labor-saving  technical  change  will  decrease  the  rate  of return  if 
12 the  wage  share  in total  output  remains  constant.  It follows  from 
Roemer  (1979)  that  no viable  technical  change  can decrease  the 
rate  of profit  if product  wages  remain  constant.  The  real  world 
often  lies  between  these  polar  cases. 
In U.S.  manufacturing  product  wages  rose  less  sharply  than 
total  average  labor  productivity  from  1970  to  1986,  forming  an 
interesting  historical  experiment  which  lies between  the  polar 
cases  noted.  Can  the basic  logic  of Roemer's  model  be  applied  to 
it?  Viable,  capital-using,  labor-saving  technical  changes  will 
not  necessarily  reduce  the  rate  of profit  if they  increase  labor 
productivity  sufficiently  more  than  product  wages  and  so 
compensate  for the  increase  in capital  per  unit  of output  they 
require.  An  increase  in the  capital-output  ratio  itself  neither 
confirms  nor  denies  the  existence  of a falling  rate  of profit 
induced  by technical  change;  among  others,  the  issue  of precisely 
how  product  wages  are  linked  to technical  change  remains.11  The 
decline  in the wage  share,  increase  in capital  per  unit  of 
output,  and  decline  in the  rate  of profit  which  coexist  from  1970 
to  1986  accent  the  importance  of theorems  applying  to this 
intermediate  case. 
VII.  Summary 
By estimating  the wage  share-profit  rate  frontier  for U.S. 
manufacturing  industry,  it is possible  to answer,  in a broad  way, 
the  rhetorical  question  posed  by the title  of this  paper.  The 
rate  of profit  is still  falling  because  the  output-capital  ratio 
is still  falling.  The period  from  1949 to  1970 emerges  as one of 
13 profit  squeeze,  with  a rising  wage  share  dominating  other 
factors;  the  manufacturing  industries  moved  back  along  the 
wage-profit  frontier.  During  the  197Os,  sharp  raw material  price 
shocks  shifted  the  frontier  inward,  depressing  both  the profit 
rate  and  the wage  share.  By  1986,  raw material  price  shocks 
ended  and  yet  neither  the  rate  of profit  nor  the wage  share  have 
resiliently  recovered,  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  of a 
persistent  decline  in the  output-capital  ratio.  It is suggested 
that  deepening  our understanding  of the Marxian  theory  of 
technical  change  in light  of these  developments  could  return  a 
large  intellectual  dividend. 
14 NOTES 
1.  Equipment  stocks  and  structures  in manufacturing  have 
similarly  increased  in relative  price.  The  index  ratios,  for 
1952,  1962,  1972,  and  1982;  of the  implicit  deflator  of stocks  to 
the  implicit  deflator  for manufacturing  GDP,  taking  equipment  and 
structures  separately,  are  66,71,79,100  and  71,63,87,100. 
2.  Surprisingly,  experiments  with  dummy  variables  in estimates 
below  suggested  little  evidence  for a change  in the  coefficient 
for raw materials  during  the price  spikes;  post-1973  dummied 
terms  were  small  in magnitude,  with  t-statistics  around  unity  or 
less.  This  issue  will  not be pursued  further. 
3.  No claim  is advanced  that  this  specification  is globally 
valid.  For  example,  because  pm  is collinear  with  its  lagged 
values,  changes  in sample  size  result  in changes  in the 
coefficients  of these  variables.  As  an experiment,  I dropped 
beginning  observations  sequentially  for the  first  years  to verify 
this.  The  coefficient  on pn was  fairly  stable. 
4.  A straightforward  rationale  for the  choice  of capacity 
utilization  adjustment  is that  it removes  much  of the bulge  in 
the  rate  of profit  during  the  196Os,  correctly,  I think, 
identifying  it with  high  levels  of activity.  See Bruno  and  Sachs 
(1985, Fig.  2A.3,  p.  55)  for a comparison  between  actual  and 
adjusted  rates  that  agrees  with  this  interpretation.  Had  figure 
1 been  generated  using  the FRB  index,  the  data  points  during  this 
period  would  appear  to wander  off to the  northeast. 
15 5.  These  data  use  the  difference  between  the  BLS  Time  Series 
Input  Output  measure  of total  manufacturing  output  and the  BEA 
measure  of GDP  to approximate  total  material  costs,  which  are 
divided  by total  output  to yield  their  share. 
6.  Note  that  a falling  wage  share  in total  output  need  not be 
mirrored  by  a rising  share  of gross  operating  surplus  in total 
output.  Both  shares  fell  from  1972 to  1986.  The wage  share  fell 
more,  and thus  the  gross  profit  share  in value  added  increased. 
7.  See Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985, Ch.  2) for a full description. 
Equation  (3) drops  a term  that  is second-order  in pm because  it 
turns  out to be  insignificant  in estimations  (both theirs  and 
mine).  PPI  is Producer  Price  Index  for Finished  Goods. 
8.  Neither  the  estimates  in table  3 nor Bruno  and  Sachs's 
original  model  make  any  allowance  for declining  rates  of 
technical  progress  in the  1970s.  Experiments  with  alternative 
trend  structures  were  unsuccessful  in generating  any meaninqful 
results  along  these  lines. 
9.  Clearly,  all the moving  about  in the wage  share  calls  the 
Cobb-Douglas  assumption  into question  since  it spans  periods  of 
similar  material  prices,  indicating  a more  general  form. 
10.  This  literature  addresses  the possibility  of a falling  rate 
of profit,  not  its necessity.  Why  should  technical  progress  be 
capital-using,  labor-saving?  This  is an hypothesis  of the model. 
One might  invoke  a monitoring  and  surveillance  justification  for 
it. 
16 11.  Obviously,  there  are a host  of other  extensions  needed  to 
bring  this  model  from  its high  level  of abstraction  to a more 
concrete  level  appropriate  for more  precise  empirical  tests, 
including  taxes,  interest,  and expectations. 
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18 Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Year 
1949  n.a.  n-a.  n.a.  62.3 
1958  63.6  10.9  52.7  61.6 
1961  63.5  9.8  53.7  60.7 
1963  62.7  9.0  53.6  59.9 
1967  62.4  7.9  54.4  59.8 
1972  61.4  8.2  53.2  61.6 
1977  63.5  10.3  53.3  65.6 
1982  66.8  13.1  53.7  67.i 
1986  n.a. 
-- 
-- 
n.a.  n.a. 
Mean 
(1948-86) 
St.  Dev. 
(1948-86) 




Table  1.  -Selected  Data  for  U.S.  Manufacturing 






Non-Raw  Total 
Material  Intermediates 
Intermediates  (BLS) 
19 Table  1.  (Continued....) 
Relative  Price  Indexes 
Non-Raw  Raw  Capital 
Material  Materials  Stocks 
Intermediates 
Column  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Year 
1949  95.2  111.3  81.0 
1958  101.3  98.5  92.2  1.88  .724 
1961  99.6  91.5  92.6  1.80  .  708 
1963  98.3  89.7  93.9  1.69  680 
1967  97.2  88.1  98.1  1.42  :572 
1972  95.2  94.1  102.0  1.36  .  528 
1977  101.0  98.2  100.4  1.39  478 
1982  100.0  100.0  100.0  1.28  :422 
1986  102.0  87.7  107.1 
Mean  99.6  100.4  95.9 
(1948-86) 




Total  GDP 
output 
2.34  .  883 
1.15  . 418 
1.60  .  601 
. 33  .146 
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Pm 



































R2  648  637 





Auto  Rho  . 663  .554  .796  .527 
Notes:  Absolute  t-statistic  is in parenthesis.  The dependent 
variable  is  (1 - w) X 100. 
21 Table  3. -Estimates  of the KLM Wage  Rate-Profit  Rate  Frontier 
Estimates 
Years  1955-78  1948-78  1948-81 
Independent 
Variables 
















-0.861  -1.766 
(1.01)  (1.99) 
-1.250  -1.092 
(2.95)  (2.36) 
3.196  2.915 






R2  830  .767 
Durbin-Watson  i.504  1.139 
Notes:  The  absolute  t-statistic  is in parenthesis 





22 Figure  I.  -Wage  Profit  FrOntler8.  U.S.  Manufacturing,  1949-66 
*. *. 
e3.s:  _ 
I  \  I 
I 












16  18  I 
80  2e  P4 
. . . . . . . . . .  1951-55 
----  1961-65 
1971-75 
1986 